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1. Introduction
Nowadays hardly anyone will dare to deny the serious security problems that computer
networks must cope with. Old-fashioned techniques for isolating the network and providing
a secure access control are just impotent to stop the attack flood since the production of code
with harmful intentions grows not only in number but in quality as well. Network Intrusion
Detection Systems (NIDS) were developed with this scenario in mind.
Historically, the first efficient methodology was misuse detection, consisting on recognising
malicious behaviours based upon a knowledge base. This technique successes on discovering
threads already registered in its database but fails when detecting new, unknown menaces.
Anomaly detection was specifically designed to address this shortcoming. This kind of
techniques model the legitimate usage of the system in order to afterwards notice, evaluate
and, if applies, avoid deviations from that normal profile. Still, its efficiency decreases
dramatically when handling well-known attacks, specially if compared to misuse detections
systems. As the reader may note, both do flop when applied to each other’s natural domain.
More in detail, misuse detection is currently the most extended approach for intrusion
prevention, mainly due to its efficiency and easy administration. It’s philosophy is quite
simple: based on a rule base that models a high number of network attacks, the system
compares incoming traffic with the registered patterns to identify any of these attacks. Hence,
it does not produce any false positive (since it always finds exactly what is registered) but it
cannot detect any new threat. Further, any slightly-modified attack will pass unnoticed. And,
finally, the knowledge base itself poses one of the biggest problems to misuse detection: as it
grows, the time to search on it increases as well and, after some time, it may require too long
to be used on real-time.
Anomaly detection systems, on the contrary, start not from malicious but from legitimate
behaviour in order to model what it is allowed to do. Any deviation from this conduct
will be seen as a potential menace. Unfortunately, this methodology is a two-sided sword
since, though it allows to discover new unknown risks, it also produces false positives (i.e.
packets or situations marked as attack when they are not). Moreover, anomaly detection
presents a constant throughput since its knowledge base does not grow uncontrollably but
gets adapted to new situations or behaviours. Again, an advantage is also source of problems
because it is theoretically possible to make use of this continuous learning to little by little
modify the knowledge so it ends seeing attacks as proper traffic (in NIDS jargon, this
phenomenon is known as session creeping). This is, its knowledge tends to be unstable. Finally,
anomaly detection, unlike misuse, demands high maintenance efforts (and costs). In sum,
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2 Intrusion Detection Systems
both alternatives present notable disadvantages that demand a new approach for network
intrusion prevention.
In previous works (Bringas & Penya, 2008; Penya & Bringas, 2008b), we presented the first
methodology to seamlessly integrate anomaly and misuse detection within one single system,
giving a proper simultaneous response to either kind of attacks, unknown and well-known
ones. This system uses a Bayesian Network that analyses incoming network packets learning
to distinguish dangerous from harmless traffic. Moreover, we evaluate it against well-known
and new attacks showing how it outperforms a well-established industrial NIDS.
Nevertheless, the training process of the Bayesian network is the Achilles’ heel of this
approach. Basically, that phase is devoted to create a knowledge representation model
combining misuse and anomaly-based data that will be used later on and it may become
intractable very fast in some extreme situations. Against this drawback, we propose the use of
expert knowledge to enhance and optimise the design of the NIDS, shortening subsequently
the training process. This expert knowledge is represented as a set of hypotheses that must be
verified to justify their utility. In this way, we have tested our approach with several samples
of data showing that all the hypotheses assumed were true and, therefore, that the proposed
methodology to trim down the design and training processes yields an optimal Bayesian
network for Intrusion Detection.
Finally, there are a number of problems and difficulties that arose in the integration process
that we solved as well; this work will also describe them as well. In summary, this article
presents a comprehensive survey of our work integrating misuse and anomaly prevention
detection in one single system (Bringas & Penya, 2008; Penya & Bringas, 2008b; Bringas &
Penya, 2009; Penya & Bringas, 2008a; Ruiz-Agundez et al., 2010).
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In section 2, we introduce the general architecture
of the system to depict the big picture. In section 3, we detail the Bayesian Network, including
its entire obtaining process. In section 4, we discuss the results obtained. In section 5, we
present the hypotheses assumed and demonstrate them true. Section 6 is devoted to explain
problems experimented and the solution adopted, and, finally, section 7 concludes and draws
the avenues of future works.
2. Architecture
The internal design of ESIDE-Depian, our integrated anomaly and misuse detector system
is principally determined by its dual nature. Being both a misuse and anomaly detection
system requires answering to sometimes clashing needs and demands. This is, it must be
able to simultaneously offer efficient response against both well-known and zero-day attacks.
In order to ease the way to this goal, ESIDE-Depian has been conceived and deployed in a
modular way that allows decomposing of the problem into several smaller units. Thereby,
Snort1 (a rule-based state of the art Misuse Detection System, see (Roesch, 1999), has been
integrated to improve the training procedure to increase the accuracy of ESIDE-Depian.
Following a strategy proven successful in this area, (Alipio et al., 2003), the reasoning engine
we present here is composed of a number of Bayesian experts working over a common
knowledge representation model.
The Bayesian experts must cover all possible areas where a menace may rise. In this way,
there are 5 Bayesian experts in ESIDE-Depian, as follows: 3 of them deal with packet headers
of TCP, UDP, ICMP and IP network protocols, the so-called TCP-IP, UDP-IP and ICMP-IP
1Available at http://www.snort.org/
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Fig. 1. ESIDE-Depian general architecture
expert modules. A further one, the Connection Tracking Expert, analyses potential temporal
dependencies between TCP network events and, finally, the Protocol Payload Expert in charge
of the packet payload analysis. In order to obtain the knowledge representation model,
each expert carries out separately a Snort-driven supervised learning process on its expertise
area. Therefore, the final knowledge representation model is the sum of the individual ones
obtained by each expert. Fig. 1 shows the general ESIDE-Depian architecture.
3. Bayesian-network-based IDS
The obtaining of the knowledge representation model in an automated manner can be
achieved in an unsupervised or supervised way. Typically, unsupervised learning approaches
don’t have into consideration expert knowledge about well-known attacks. They achieve
their own decisions based on several mathematical representations of distance between
observations from the target system, revealing themselves as ideal for performing Anomaly
Detection. On the other hand, supervised learning models do use expert knowledge in
their making of decisions, in the line of Misuse Detection paradigm, but usually present
high-cost administrative requirements. Thus, both approaches present important advantages
and several shortcomings. Being both ESIDE-Depian, it is necessary to set a balanced solution
that enables to manage in an uniform way both kinds of knowledge. Therefore, ESIDE-Depian
uses not only Snort information gathering capabilities, but also Snort’s decision-based
network traffic labelling. Thereby, the learning processes inside ESIDE-Depian can be
considered as automatically-supervised Bayesian learning, divided into the following phases.
Please note that this sequence only applies for the standard generation process followed by
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4 Intrusion Detection Systems
the Packet Header Parameter Analysis experts, (i.e. the TCP-IP, UDP-IP and ICMP-IP expert
modules):
– Traffic sample obtaining: First we need to establish the information source in order to gather
the sample. This set usually includes normal traffic (typically gathered from the network
by sniffing, ARP-poisoning or so), as well as malicious traffic generated by the well-known
arsenal of hacking tools such as (Metasploit, 2006), etc. Subsequently, the Snort Intrusion
Detection System embedded in ESIDE-Depian adds labelling information regarding the
legitimacy or malice of the network packets. Specifically, Snort’s main decision about a
packet is added to the set of detection parameters, receiving the name of attack variable. In
this way, it is possible to obtain a complete sample of evidences, including, in the formal
aspect of the sample, both protocol fields and also Snort labelling information. Therefore,
it combines knowledge about normal behaviour and also knowledge about well-known
attacks, or, in other words, information necessary for Misuse Detection and for Anomaly
Detection.
– Structural Learning: The next step is devoted to define the operational model ESIDE-Depian
should work within. With this goal in mind, we have to provide logical support for
knowledge extracted from network traffic information. Packet parameters need to be
related into a Bayesian structure of nodes and edges, in order to ease the later conclusion
inference over this mentioned structure. In particular, the PC-Algorithm (Spirtes et al.,
2001) is used here to achieve the structure of causal and/or correlative relationships among
given variables from data. In other words, the PC-Algorithm uses the traffic sample data to
define the Bayesian model, representing the whole set of dependence and independence
relationships among detection parameters. Due to its high requirements in terms of
computational and temporal resources, this phase is usually performed off-line.
– Parametric Learning: The knowledge representation model fixed so far is a qualitative
one. Therefore, the following step is to apply parametric learning in order to obtain
the quantitative model representing the strength of the collection of previously learned
relationships, before the exploitation phase began. Specifically, ESIDE-Depian implements
maximum likelihood estimate (Murphy, 2001) to achieve this goal. This method completes
the Bayesian model obtained in the previous step by defining the quantitative description
of the set of edges between parameters. This is, structural learning finds the structure of
probability distribution functions among detection parameters, and parametric learning
fills this structure with proper conditional probability values. The high complexity of this
phase suggests a deeper description, that is accomplished in section 3.
– Bayesian Inference: Next, every packet capture from the target communication infrastructure
needs one value for the posterior probability of a badness variable, (i.e. the Snort label),
given the set of observable packet detection parameters. So, we need an inference engine
based on Bayesian evidence propagation. More accurately, we use the Lauritzen and
Spiegelhalter method for conclusion inference over junction trees, provided it is slightly
more efficient than any other in terms of response time (Castillo et al., 1997). Thereby,
already working in real time, incoming packets are analysed by this method (with the
basis of observable detection parameters obtained from each network packet) to define the
later probability of the attack variable. The continuous probability value produced here
represents the certainty that an evidence is good or bad. Generally, a threshold based alarm
mechanism can be added in order to get a balance between false positive and negative rates,
depending on the context.
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– Adaptation: Normally, the system operation does not keep a static on-going way, but
usually presents more or less important deviations as a result of service installation or
reconfiguration, deployment of new equipment, and so on. In order to keep the knowledge
representation model updated with potential variations in the normal behaviour of the
target system, ESIDE-Depian uses the general sequential/incremental maximum likelihood
estimates (Murphy, 2001) (in a continuous or periodical way) in order to achieve continuous
adaptation of the model to potential changes in the normal behaviour of traffic.
3.1 Connection tracking and payload analysis Bayesian experts knowledge representation
model generation
The Connection Tracking expert attends to potential temporal influence among network
events within TCP-based protocols (Estevez-Tapiador et al., 2003), and, therefore, it requires
a structure that allows to include the concept of time (predecessor, successor) in its model.
Similarly, the Payload Analysis expert, devoted to packet payload analysis, needs to model
state transitions among symbols and tokens in the payload (following the strategy proposed
in (Kruegel & Vigna, 2003). Usually, Markov models are used in such contexts due to
their capability to represent problems based on stochastic state transitions. Nevertheless,
the Bayesian concept is even more suited since it not only includes representation of
time (in an inherent manner), but also provides generalisation of the classical Markov
models adding features for complex characterisation of states. Specifically, the Dynamic
Bayesian Network (DBN) concept is commonly recognised as a superset of Hidden Markov
Models (Ghahramani, 1998), and, among other capabilities, it can represent dependence
and independence relationships between parameters within one common state (i.e. in the
traditional static Bayesian style), and also within different chronological states.
Thus, ESIDE-Depian implements a fixed two-node DBN structure to emulate the
Markov-Chain Model (with at least the same representational power and also the possibility
to be extended in the future with further features) because full-exploded use of Bayesian
concepts can remove several restrictions of Markov-based designs. For instance, it is not
necessary to establish the first-instance structural learning process used by the packet header
analysis experts since the structure is clear in beforehand.
Moreover, according to (Estevez-Tapiador et al., 2003) and (Kruegel & Vigna, 2003), the
introduction of an artificial parameter may ease this kind of analysis. Respectively, the
Connection Tracking expert defines an artificial detection parameter, named TCP-h-flags
(which is based on an arithmetical combination of TCP header flags) and the Payload Analysis
expert uses the symbol and token (in fact, there are two Payload Analysis experts: one for
token analysis and another for symbol analysis).
Finally, traffic behaviour (and so TCP flags temporal transition patterns) as well as payload
protocol lexical and syntactical patterns may differ substantially depending on the sort of
service provided from each specific equipment (i.e. from each different IP address and from
each specific TCP destination port). To this end, ESIDE-Depian uses a multi-instance schema,
with several Dynamic Bayesian Networks, one for each combination of TCP destination
address and port. Afterwards, in the exploitation phase, Bayesian inference can be performed
from real-time incoming network packets. In this case, the a-priori fixed structure suggests
the application of the expectation and maximisation algorithm (Murphy, 2001), in order to
calculate not the posterior probability of attack, but the probability which a single packet fits
the learned model with.
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3.2 Naive Bayesian network of the expert modules
Having different Bayesian modules is a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, the more specific
expertise of each module allows them to deliver more accurate verdicts but, on the other hand,
there must be a way to solve possible conflicting decisions. In other words, a unique measure
must emerge from the diverse judgements.
To this end, ESIDE-Depian presents a two-tiered schema where the first layer is composed of
the results from the expert modules and the second layer includes only one class parameter:
the most conservative response among those provided by Snort and the expert modules
community (i.e. in order to prioritises the absence of false negatives in front of false positives).
Thus, both layers form, in fact, a Naive Bayesian Network (as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).
Such a Naive classifier (Castillo et al., 1997) has been proposed sometimes in Network
Intrusion Detection, mostly for Anomaly Detection. This approach provides a good balance
between representative power and performance, and also affords interesting flexibility
capabilities which allow, for instance, ESIDE-Depian’s dynamical enabling and disabling of
expert modules, in order to support heavy load conditions derived e.g. from denial of service
attacks.
Now, Naive Bayesian Network parameters should have a discrete nature which, depending
on the expert, could not be the case. To remove this problem, ESIDE-Depian allows the using
of the aforementioned set of administratively-configured threshold conditioning functions.
Finally, the structure of the Naive Bayesian Network model is fixed in beforehand, assuming
the existence of conditional independence hypothesis among every possible cause and the
standing of dependency edges between these causes and the effect or class. Therefore, here
is also not necessary to take into consideration any structural learning process for it; only
sequential parametric learning must be performed, while the expert modules produce their
packet classifying verdicts during their respective parametric learning stages.
Once this step is accomplished, the inference of unified conclusions and the sequential
adaptation of knowledge can be provided in the same way mentioned before. Fig. 2 details
the individual knowledge models and how do they fit to conform the general one.
3.3 The structural learning challenge
As it was outlined before, Structural Learning allows modelling in a completely automated
way the set of dependence and independence relationships that can exist between the
different detection parameters. Nevertheless, in situations that have a large volume of
evidences and detection parameters with many different possible states, the aforementioned
PC Algorithm (as well as similar alternative methods) presents very high computational
requirements. Moreover, depending on the inner complexity of the set of relationships,
those requirements can grow even more. Therefore, the complexity depends entirely on the
nature of data, rendering it unpredictable so far. In this way, this task may be sometimes too
resource-demanding for small and medium computing platforms. Against this background,
we have developed a method that splits the traffic sample horizontally in order to reduce the
complexity the structural learning process. This method is detailed next.
First of all, please note that the different structural learning methods commonly use a
significance parameter in order to define in a flexible manner the strength that a dependence
relationship needs in fact to be considered as a definitive one in the Bayesian Network.
Thus, this significance parameter can be used to relativise the concept of equality required
in the independence tests implemented inside the learning algorithms; in particular, inside
the PC Algorithm. On the one hand, a high significance value produces a higher number
160 Intrusion D tection Systems
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of connections in the Bayesian model, with an increase on the degree of representativeness
but also with larger requirements in terms of main memory and computational power and
the possibility that overfitting occurs. On the other hand, a low significance value usually
produces a sparse Bayesian Network, with lower requirements but also less semantic power.
Therefore, in order to achieve a trade-off between representativeness and throughput, we have
implemented the expansion of the structural learning process through multiple significance
levels. More accurately, we have used the seven most representative magnitude-orders.
Once the expansion process is planned, it is possible to proceed with the structural learning
process itself, applied in this case to the TCP-IP, UDP-IP and ICMP-IP protocols, which were
defined a priori as a set of working dependence and independence hypotheses based on each
different RFC. It is also possible to apply the PC Algorithm to the entire traffic sample in order
to verify the accuracy of these hypotheses. In our case, this process was estimated to long 3,591
hours (150 days) of continuous learning. Thus, and also considering that this is a generalised
problem, we propose the parallelisation of the collection of learning processes, depending
on the equipment available for the researcher. In fact, this parallelisation, performed over
60 computers at the same time managed to reduce the overall time to 59.85 nominal hours.
Finally, one instance of the PC Algorithm was applied to every fragment, for each of the four
data-sets, and with the seven different significance values, 1197 partial Bayesian structures
were obtained at this point.
3.4 Partial Bayesian structures unifying process
The collection of partial Bayesian structures obtained in the previous phase must be unified
into an unique Bayesian Network that gives a full representation of the application domain.
With this purpose, we defined a statistical measure based on the frequency of apparition in
the set of partial structures of each dependence relationship between every two detection
parameters.
In this way, it is possible to calculate one single Bayesian structure, for each of the 7
significance levels and for each of the 4 data sets, remaining only 28 partial structures from the
initial 1197. The next step will achieve the definitive unifying. To this end, we use the average
value for each of the edges between variables, which allows us to reach the desired balance
between representativeness and throughput by means of the subsequent selective addition
to the Bayesian model of those edges above a specific and configurable (depending on the
application domain) significance threshold.
Still, both the horizontal splitting of the traffic sample and also the significance-based
expansion present an important problem: the cycles that can appear in the Bayesian model
obtained after unifying, which render the model invalid. An additional step prevents such
cycles by using the average value obtained before as a criteria for the selection of the weakest
edge in the cycle, which is the one to be deleted.
4. Experiments and results
In order to measure the performance of ESIDE-Depian, we have designed two different
kinds of experiments. In the first group, the network suffers well-known attacks (i.e.
Misuse Detection) and, in the second group, zero-day attacks (i.e. Anomaly Detection),
putting each aspect of the double nature of ESIDE-Depian to the test. In both cases, the
system was fed with a simulation of network traffic comprising more than 700.000 network
packets that were sniffed during one-hour capture from a University network. The first
experiment (corresponding to Misuse Detection) aimed to compare Snort and the Packet
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Indicator TCP UDP ICMP
Analysed net packets 699.568 5.130 1.432
Snort’s hits 38 0 450
ESIDE-Depian’s hits 38 0 450
Anomalous packets 600 2 45
False negatives 0 0 0
Potential false positives 0,08% 0,03% 3,14%
Table 1. Bayesian expert modules for TCP, UDP and ICMP header analysis results.
Header Parameters Analysis experts. To this end, Snort’s rule-set-based knowledge was used
as the main reference for the labelling process, instantiated through Sneeze Snort-stimulator
(Roesch, 1999). The sample analysed was a mixture of normal and poisoned traffic. Table 1
details the results of this experiment.
As it can be seen, the three experts achieved a 100% rate of hitting success. Anyway, such
results are not surprising, since ESIDE-Depian integrates Snort’s knowledge and if Snort is
able to detect an attack, ESIDE-Depian should do so. Nevertheless, not only the number of
hits is important; the number of anomalous packets detected reflects the level of integration
between the anomaly and the misuse detection part of ESIDE-Depian. In fact, the latter can be
highlighted as the most important achievement of ESIDE-Depian: detecting unusual packets
preserving the misuse detection advantages at the same time. Concerning potential false rates,
it is possible to observe that very good rates are reached for TCP and UDP protocols (according
to the values defined in (Crothers, 2002) to be not human-operator-exhausting), but not so
good for ICMP. Table 1 shows, however, a significant bias in the number of attacks introduced
in the ICMP traffic sample (above 30%), and labelled as so by Snort; thus, it is not strange the
slightly excessive rate of anomalous packets detected here by ESIDE-Depian.
In the second experiment (also corresponding to misuse detection), the goal was to test the
other expert modules (Connection Tracking and Payload Analysis). With this objective in
mind, a set of attacks against a representation of popular services were fired through several
hacking tools such as (Metasploit, 2006). The outcome of this test is summarised in Table 2.
Payload Payload
Indicator Conn. Analysis Analysis
Tracking (Symbol) (Token)
Analysed
226.428 2.676 2.676
net packets
Attacks
29 139 19
in sample
ESIDE
29 139 19
Depian hits
Anomalous
0 0 3
net packets
False
0 0 0
negatives
Pot. false
0% 0% 0,11%
positives
Table 2. Bayesian expert modules for TCP, UDP and ICMP header analysis results.
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Protocol Artificial Network Anomaly Snort ESIDE-Depian
TCP
packit -nnn -s 10.12.206.2
x
√
-d 10.10.10.100 -F SFP -D 1023
TCP
packit nnn -s 10.12.206.2
x
√
-d 10.10.10.100 -F SAF
UDP
packit -t udp -s 127.0.0.1
x
√
-d 10.10.10.2 -o 0x10
-n 1 -T ttl -S 13352 -D 21763
UDP
packit -t udp -s 127.0.0.1
x
√
-d 10.10.10.2 -o 0x50
-n 0 -T ttl -S 13352 -D 21763
ICMP
packit -i eth0 -t icmp -K 17
x
√
-C 0 -d 10.10.10.2
Table 3. Example of Zero-day attacks detected by ESIDE-Depian and not by Snort.
As we see, ESIDE-Depian prevailed in all cases with a 0% rate of false negatives and a
100% of hitting rate success. Still, not only Snort’s knowledge and normal traffic behaviour
absorption was tested; the third experiment intended to assess ESIDE-Depian’s performance
with zero-day attacks. With this idea in mind, a sample of artificial anomalies (Lee et al.,
2001) was prepared with Snort’s rule set as basis and crafted (by means of the tool Packit)
with slight variations aiming to avoid Snort’s detection (i.e. Zero-day attacks unnoticeable for
misuse detection systems). Some of these attacks are detailed next in Table 3.
Note that overcoming of Snort’s expert knowledge only has sense in those expert modules
using this knowledge. This is, in protocol header specialised modules, because the semantics
of Snort’s labelling does not fit the morphology of payload and dynamic nature parameters.
5. Optimal knowledge base design
As we have shown, ESIDE-Depian is able to simultaneously offer efficient response against
both well-known and zero-day attacks. In order to ease the way to this goal, our system has
been conceived and deployed in a modular way that allows decomposing of the problem into
several smaller units (see section 2). Still, the design and training process of the Bayesian
network (BN) demanded huge computational efforts that prevented it from being applied in
the real world. Against this background, in this section we present a methodology to enhance
the design of the BN (and, thus, shorten the training process) by using expert knowledge.
This strategy has been previously used in data mining classifiers (Sinha & Zhao, 2008), for
normalizing and binning gene expression data in BN (Helman et al., 2004) or for generalized
partition testing via Bayes linear methods (Coolen et al., 2001).
As already introduced in section 3, Bayesian networks require two learning steps to be ready
to infer results. The first one is the structural learning process that obtains the probability
distribution table associated to each variable. The second one is the parametric learning process
that refines the initial graph. Finally, the system uses a Naive Bayesian network to unify the
different experts providing an excellent balance between knowledge representation capacity
and performance. It assumes the existence of conditional independence hypotheses within every
possible cause and the standing of dependency edges between these causes and the effect
or class applicable to this problem domain. These hypotheses are the representation of the
experts knowledge that tunes the Bayesian network design and training, creating the optimal
64 Intrusion D tection Systems
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network.
5.1 Establishing the hypothesis of dependence and independence
Due to the fact the structural learning methods are able to infer by themselves the relations
of dependence and independence of the structure, expert knowledge can refine the resulting
model and, hence, the exploitation of the Bayesian network is done in the most efficient way.
In this way, we use hypothesis of dependence and independence to refine our knowledge
representation model. In particular, the hypotheses are based on the specific issues of four
network protocols (IP, ICMP, TCP and UDP). The expert knowledge is based on the following
six hypotheses of dependence and independence:
Hypothesis 1: Dependence between TCP and IP. The set of the detection parameters of the TCP
protocol is dependent of the set of the detection parameters of the IP, and vice versa.
Hypothesis 2: Dependence between UDP and IP. The set of the detection parameters of the UDP
protocol is dependent of the set of the detection parameters of the IP, and vice versa.
Hypothesis 3: Dependence between ICMP and IP. The set of the detection parameters of the
ICMP protocol is dependent of the set of the detection parameters of the IP, and vice
versa.
Hypothesis 4: Independence between TCP and UDP. The set of the detection parameters of the
TCP protocol is dependent of the set of the detection parameters of the UDP, and vice
versa.
Hypothesis 5: Independence between TCP and ICMP. The set of the detection parameters of the
TCP protocol is independent of the set of the detection parameters of the ICMP, and
vice versa.
Hypothesis 6: Independence between UDP and ICMP. The set of the detection parameters of the
UDP protocol is independent of the set of the detection parameters of the ICMP, and
vice versa.
These hypotheses are supported by the respective set of Request For Comments (RFC) of
each protocol. An empirical demonstration of the hypotheses is done demonstrating that
the knowledge representation model generated from them can be successfully used in the
reasoning engine.
Besides, the heterogeneity of the detection parameters headers (information used by
the protocols), and data (information used by the users) themselves implies a different
formalization for each case. The analysis model is static (based on Bayesian networks) in
the case of the head parameters and dynamic (based on Dynamic Bayesian networks) in the
case of data parameters. The first group forms an information entity and it is, therefore,
susceptible of being used directly in the process of analysis. On the other hand, the second
group represents a variable flow of information entities in both lexical and a syntactic levels
that requires a specific analysis. Considering all this, another hypothesis is pointed out:
Hypothesis 7: Independence between head and data fields. The set of detection parameters
corresponding to the head fields of IP, ICMP, TCP and UDP protocols is independent
from the data fields of the corresponding protocols, and vice versa.
Finally, there is an additional aspect to consider. Since for this experiment only one time step
is considered, it is not possible to have the second evidence required by the dynamic model.
Please note that when more temporal steps are added this restriction disappears.
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Hypothesis 8: Independence between static and dynamic parameters. In the case of one temporal
step Dynamic Bayesian networks, the set of detection parameters used in the static
analysis methods are independent from those used in the dynamic analysis methods,
and vice versa.
The specification of the previous hypotheses of dependence and independence defines
separated working areas, in which different analysis methods will be applied depending on
the type of the detection parameter.
On one hand, we have the head parameters of all the protocols that can be treated in a
homogeneous way. These cases can be introduced straightforward into the structural learning
process. On the other hand, each protocol data has its own properties and therefore has to be
resolved in an independent way. In the case of dynamic parameters, multiple evidences are
required, and hence, they will have an independent treatment too.
5.2 Validation of the hypotheses
In order to assess the validity of the work hypothesis described in the previous section, we
have performed different kinds of experiments. We start our experiments from the knowledge
representation model made up of different Bayesian networks that form the reasoning engine.
From then on, and considering the hypotheses of dependence and independence, we analyse
the obtained results of the structural learning process. As the results confirm the hypotheses
of dependence and independence, the RFC specifications of each protocol are ratified. Finally,
a knowledge representation model based on the different Bayesian networks can be built.
Taking that into account, and with the objective of minimising the possible appearance of
noise in the results that could affect the final conclusions about the hypothesis, we have
set a threshold value. Above this threshold value a link between two variables will not be
representative. According to our methodology, two protocols will be independent if and only
if there are no representative relations between the set of parameters of either of them. The
hypotheses of dependence and independence are proved to be true:
– Hypothesis 1: Dependence between TCP and IP. Table 4 shows the relations between
the parameters of TCP and IP, verifying that there are many significant links between the
corresponding detection parameters of each protocol, in both ways. Therefore, there are
variables of the TCP protocol Bayesian network that depend on variables of the IP protocol,
and vice versa. Hence, the hypothesis of dependence between TCP and IP is confirmed.
– Hypothesis 2: Dependence between UDP and IP. Equally, as table 5 show the data of
the experiment points out the relation between the head parameters of the UDP and IP
protocols. There are enough significant links between the detection parameters of both
protocols, in both ways. Therefore, there are variables of the UDP protocol in the Bayesian
network that depend on variables of the IP protocol, and vice versa. Hence, the hypothesis
of dependence between UDP and IP is also confirmed.
– Hypothesis 3: Dependence between ICMP and IP. Table 6 show the case of ICMP and IP
protocols, the data of the experiment points out the relation between the head parameters
of both protocols. There are enough significant links between the detection parameters, in
both ways. Therefore, there are variables of the ICMP protocol in the Bayesian network that
depend on variables of the IP protocol, and vice versa. Hence, the hypothesis of dependence
between ICMP and IP is confirmed similarly.
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child\parent ip-h-dst ip-h-src ip-h-proto ip-h-tll ip-h-df ip-h-tl ip-h-tos
tcp-h-uptr - - 15,61 - - - -
tcp-h-win 2,40 2,09 - 2,89 4,46 - 13,55
tcp-h-cwr - 0,49 - - - 31,32 -
tcp-h-ece - - 11,08 - - - 2,33
tcp-h-psh - - 6,63 0,71 - - 1,38
tcp-h-urg - - 12,43 - - - -
tcp-h-ack - - - - - - 2,17
tcp-h-rst - - 1,31 1,08 1,92 - -
tcp-h-syn 0,71 - - - 1,79 - -
tcp-h-fin - - - 1,02 - - -
tcp-h-off - - - 1,98 - - 28,74
tcp-h-ackn - - - - - - -
tcp-h-seq - - - - 1,74 - -
tcp-h-dport 3,84 1,08 - - - 9,04 -
tcp-h-sport 8,01 3,57 - - - 8,40 -
Table 4. Frequency of links appearance in the Bayesian network for relations of dependence
of IP parameters over TCP parameters
– Hypothesis 4: Independence between TCP and UDP. Table 7 show the hypothesis
of independence between TCP and UDP, the data of the experiment points out the
independence between the detection parameters of both protocols, in none of both ways.
There are not enough significant links between the detection parameters, in none of both
ways. Therefore, there are not variables of the TCP protocol that depend on the variables
of the UDP protocol, and vice versa. Hence, the hypothesis of independence between TCP
and UDP is also verified.
– Hypothesis 5: Independence between TCP and ICMP. Similarly, table 8 shows that the
data of the experiment points out the independence between the detection parameters of
TCP and ICMP protocols, in any way. There are not enough significant links between the
detection parameters, in any way. Therefore, there are not variables of the TCP protocol
that depend on the variables of the ICMP protocol, and vice versa. Hence, the hypothesis
of independence between TCP and ICMP is also proved.
child\parent udp-h-chk udp-h-l udp-h-dport udp-h-sport
ip-h-dst - - 1,61 -
ip-h-src 9,65 1,02 3,88 1,79
ip-h-proto - - 2,04 3,65
ip-h-tll - - - -
ip-h-df - - 1,02 -
ip-h-id - - - -
ip-h-tl - - - -
ip-h-tos - - - -
ip-h-hl - - - -
Table 5. Frequency of links appearance in the Bayesian network for relations of dependence
of UDP parameters over IP parameters
167Integral Misuse and Anomaly Detection a d Preventio  System
www.intechopen.com
14 Intrusion Detection Systems
child\parent icmp-hchk icmp-hcode icmp-htype
ip-h-dst - - -
ip-h-src - - -
ip-h-proto - 2,90 -
ip-h-tll - - -
ip-h-df - - -
ip-h-id - - -
ip-h-tl - - -
ip-h-tos - 8,94 -
ip-h-hl - - -
Table 6. Frequency of links appearance in the Bayesian network for relations of dependence
of ICMP parameters over IP parameters
– Hypothesis 6: Independence between UDP and ICMP. Finally, in table 9 and table 10, the
data of the experiment points out the independence between the detection parameters of
UDP and ICMP protocols, in anyway. There are not enough significant links between the
detection parameters, in none of both ways. Therefore, there are not variables of the UDP
protocol that depend on the variables of the ICMP protocol, and vice versa. Hence, the
hypothesis of independence between UDP and ICMP is also verified.
The validity of the hypotheses 7 and 8 is already proved by their set out. This is, the set of
detection parameters corresponding to the head fields of IP, ICMP, TCP and UDP protocols is
independent from the data fields of the corresponding protocols, and vice versa. In the case
of one temporal step dynamic BN, the set of detection parameters used in the static analysis
methods are independent from those used in the dynamic analysis methods, and vice versa.
Since the results confirm the hypothesis of dependence and independence, the RFC
specifications of each protocol are ratified. Therefore, a knowledge representation model
child\parent udp-hchk udp-h-l udp-h-dport udp-h-sport
tcp-h-uptr 0,49 - 2,86 -
tcp-h-win - - - -
tcp-h-cwr - - - -
tcp-h-ece 0,59 - 2,63 1,79
tcp-h-psh - 1,79 1,79 0,59
tcp-h-urg 1,02 - 1,57 4,11
tcp-h-ack - - - -
tcp-h-rst - - - 1,79
tcp-h-syn - - - -
tcp-h-fin - - - -
tcp-h-off - - - -
tcp-h-ackn - - - -
tcp-h-seq - - - -
tcp-h-dport - - - -
tcp-h-sport - - - -
Table 7. Frequency of links appearance in the Bayesian network for relations of dependence
of UDP parameters over TCP parameters
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child\parent icmp-hchk icmp-hcode icmp-htype
tcp-h-uptr - 2,86 -
tcp-h-win - - -
tcp-h-cwr - - -
tcp-h-ece - - -
tcp-h-psh - 0,59 -
tcp-h-urg - 3,52 -
tcp-h-ack - - -
tcp-h-rst - - -
tcp-h-syn - - -
tcp-h-fin - 0,49 -
tcp-h-off - - -
tcp-h-ackn - - -
tcp-h-seq - - -
tcp-h-dport - - -
tcp-h-sport - - -
Table 8. Frequency of links appearance in the Bayesian network for relations of dependence
of ICMP parameters over TCP parameters
based on the different Bayesian networks can be built, decreasing in this way the complexity
of the design of the BN and minimising its training process.
6. Problems and solutions
This section gives account of the main problems that emerged during the design and test
phase. More accurately, they were:
– Integration of Snort: The first difficulty we faced was to find an effective way of integrating
Snort in the system. Our first attempt placed the verdict of Snort at the same level as
those of the Bayesian experts in the Naive classifier. This strategy failed to capture the
real possibilities of Bayesian networks since it simply added the information generated by
Snort at the end of the process, more as a graft than a real integrated part of the model. The
key aspect in this situation was letting the Bayesian network absorb Snort’s knowledge to
be able to actually replace it. Therefore, in the next prototype we recast the role of Snort as a
kind of advisor, both in training and in working time. In this way, the Bayesian experts
use Snort’s opinion on the badness of incoming packets in the learning procedure and
afterwards and manage to exceed Snort’s knowledge (Penya & Bringas, 2008b).
– Different parameter nature: The next challenge consisted on the different nature of the
parameters that ESIDE-Depian has to control. Whereas TCP, UDP and ICMP are static and
child\parent icmp-h-chk icmp-h-code icmp-h-type
udp-h-chk - - -
udp-h-l - - -
udp-h-dport - - -
udp-h-sport - - -
Table 9. Frequency of links appearance in the Bayesian network for relations of dependence
of ICMP parameters over UDP parameters
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child\parent udp-h-chk udp-h-l udp-h-dport udp-h-sport
icmp-h-chk - - - -
icmp-h-code - - - -
icmp-h-type - - - -
Table 10. Frequency of links appearance in the Bayesian network for relations of dependence
of UDP parameters over ICMP parameters
refer exclusively to one packet (more accurately to its header), the connection tracking and
payload analysis experts are dynamic and require the introduction of the time notion. In
this way, the connection tracking expert checks if packets belong to an organised sequence
of an attack, so time is needed to represent predecessor and successor events. Similarly,
the payload analysis expert must model state transitions between symbols and tokens that
appear on it. Thus, in the same way that different tests had to be performed (see (Penya
& Bringas, 2008b), we had to prepare an special traffic sample tailored to the kind of traffic
those expert should focus to inspect.
– Disparity between good and bad traffic amount: Another problem to tackle was the
composition of the traffic sample used to train the first group of experts (TCP, UDP, ICMP).
In order to help the acquisition of the initial reference knowledge in the training phase, the
BN is fed with a traffic sample basically based on the attack-detection rules battery provided
by Snort. Therefore, the training acquaints the BN with either kind of traffic simultaneously,
good and bad. Still, due to the disparity in the amount of packets belonging to one or another,
traces containing attacks have to be fed several times (in the so-called presentation cycles) in
order to let the BN learn to evaluate them properly. In this way, the TCP expert required
2943 presentation cycles, the UDP expert 2 and the ICMP expert also 2. The high number of
presentation cycles required by the TCP-IP expert to grasp the initial reference knowledge
is due to the very high good/bad traffic ratio, much lower in the cases of UDP and ICMP.
– Task parallelisation: Bayesian networks require many computational resources. Thus,
some of the tasks to be performed were designed in a parallel way to accelerate it. For
instance, the structural learning was devoted concurrently in 60 computers. In this way,
the traffic sample (about 900.000 packets) was divided in blocks of 10.000 of packets that
were processed with the PC-Algorithm (see section 3). Moreover, already on real-time,
each expert was placed in a different machine not only to divide the amount of resources
consumed but also to prevent from having a single point of failure.
– False positives and false negatives: Finally, we coped with a usual problem related to
anomaly detection systems: false positives (i.e. packets marked as potentially dangerous
when they are harmless). In fact, minimising false positives is one of the pending challenges
of this approach. Nevertheless, the double nature of ESIDE-Depian as anomaly and misuse
detector reduces the presence of false positives to a minimum (Penya & Bringas, 2008b).
False negatives, on the contrary, did threaten the system and, in this way, in the experiments
accomplished in ESIDE-Depian, security was prioritized above comfort, so quantitative
alarm-thresholds were set upon the production of the minimum false negatives, in spite of
the false positive rates. It is possible to find application domains, e.g. anti-virus software,
in which false positive numbers are the target to be optimized, in order not to saturate the
final user or the system administrator. Also in these cases ESIDE-Depian is able to manage
the detection problem, simply by the specific setting-up of the mentioned thresholds.
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7. Conclusions and future works
Network Intrusion Detection Systems monitor local networks to separate legitimate from
dangerous behaviours. According to their capabilities and goals, NIDS are divided into
Misuse Detection Systems (which aim to detect well-known attacks) and Anomaly Detection
Systems (which aim to detect zero-day attacks). So far, no system to our knowledge combines
advantages of both without any of their disadvantages. Moreover, the use of historical data
for analysis or sequential adaptation is usually ignored, missing in this way the possibility of
anticipating the behaviour of the target system.
Our system addresses both needs. We present here an approach integrating Snort as
Misuse detector trainer so the Bayesian Network of five experts is able to react against
both Misuse and Anomalies. The Bayesian Experts are devoted to the analysis of different
network protocol aspects and obtain the common knowledge model by means of separated
Snort-driven automated learning process. A naive Bayesian network integrates the results
of the experts, all the partial verdicts achieved by them. Since ESIDE-Depian has passed
the experiments brilliantly, it is possible to conclude that ESIDE-Depian using of Bayesian
Networking concepts allows to confirm an excellent basis for paradigm unifying Network
Intrusion Detection, providing not only stable Misuse Detection but also effective Anomaly
Detection capabilities, with only one flexible knowledge representation model and a
well-proofed inference and adaptation bunch of methods.
Moreover, we have accurately studied how to create a model of knowledge representation.
First of all, we obtained a representative data sample. Second, we defined how many
temporal steps we were going to use for our experiment. Third, we established the hypothesis
according to the expert knowledge. Fourth, we planned the process of structural learning
and performed it. After this step, we obtained statistical metrics from the partial Bayesian
networks. These partial fragments were unified and adapted before verifying the hypotheses
of dependence and independence. Finally, we obtained the optimal structural definition of
the knowledge representation model on which we performed parametric learning. According
to this experiment, we have proved the validity of the hypotheses and obtained the optimal
BN for Network Intrusion Detection Systems. This knowledge model is currently being used
as the expert system of our own IDS architecture.
It is worth mentioning that the integration of misuse and anomaly was very challenging and
we had to cope with the following problems. First of all, the most effective placement for Snort
within the model. Then, the composition of these training samples posed also a problem, since
the ratio between good and bad traffic was too low. Furthermore, is very resource demanding
and, finally, integrating misuse and anomaly simultaneously prevented it from presenting a
high rate of false negatives, which is a typical inconvenience of anomaly detectors, but, still,
we had to cope with the problem of false negatives.
Future work will focus on the so-called data-aging problem. The constant feeding of upcoming
data issues poses a new challenge to the Bayesian network: it extends and enhances its
knowledge base but, in parallel, information about these new traffic has too less importance
compared to older ones, and therefore, predictions about new packets are not as exact as they
should be. Therefore, further work will be concentrated on how to extrapolate the techniques
developed to the very special case we deal here with. Furthermore, we will research on the
use of expert knowledge for Bayesian networks modelling over different domains beyond the
Intrusion Detection and the creation of a formal metric. This metric will measure the impact
of the use of expert knowledge in the model creation time and the final performance of a
Bayesian network.
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